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Abstract: 
From 2002 to 2006, German wholesale electricity prices more than doubled. The purpose of this paper 
is to estimate the price components in 2006 in order to identify the factors responsible for the increase. 
We develop a competitive benchmark model, taking into account power plant characteristics, fuel and 
CO2-allowance prices, wind generation, cross-border flows, unit commitment and start-up conditions, 
to estimate the difference between generation costs and observed market prices for every hour in 2006. 
We find that prices at the German wholesale market (EEX) are above competitive levels for a large 
fraction of the observations. We verify the robustness of the results by carrying out sensitivity 
analyses. We also address the issue of revenue adequacy. 
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1 Introduction 
Market power is a significant issue for restructured electricity markets around the world. At the same 
time, questions about resource adequacy of investments in generation have resurged both in the U.S. 
and in Europe, driven by concerns about supply security. The German electricity market has 
undergone significant changes in the last decade, yet the scientific discussion about the appropriate 
market design is still in its infancy. Since the first EU liberalization directive 96/92/EC was 
promulgated, Germany has taken almost a decade to address critical issues such as network tariff 
regulation and market monitoring. Since 2006, the newly established regulator (“Bundesnetzagentur”) 
has published cost-based revisions of transmission and distribution network tariffs, and is now 
considering alternative instruments of congestion management, cross-border trading, etc; incentive 
regulation should be operational by 2009. Current political discussion has begun to focus on the 
generation sector, especially since average spot prices at the European Energy Exchange (EEX) rose 
by almost 125% from 2002 to 2006. However, a price increase is no proof of malfunctioning markets 
or market power abuse; during the same period fuel prices rose significantly and the Europe’s 
emissions allowance trading scheme was implemented. On the other hand, the oligopolistic structure 
of Germany’s generation market particularly lends itself to abuse, with a duopoly controlling over 
55% of market share, and the largest four firms owning almost 85%. 
This paper analyzes the level of competition in the country’s wholesale electricity markets, by 
comparing the observed prices with estimated costs and market clearing prices under the hypothesis of 
perfect competition. We develop a competitive benchmark model testing the observed EEX market 
prices for 2006. We hypothesize that the oligopolistic structure of electricity generation leads to 
significant price mark-ups when compared to short-term marginal costs.  
In the next section, a survey of market power analysis in other countries (mainly the US. and the UK) 
and the most recent studies on Germany are provided. Section 3 presents the competitive benchmark 
model and introduces the data. The analysis is based on publicly available data on electricity prices, 
generation capacities and costs, wind input, and cross-border flows for 2006. We find that the 
observed prices exceed marginal costs especially in peak load situations. We also present the earned 
revenues of generators in 2006 based on the model’s spot market structure. The results are confirmed 
by sensitivity analyses that account for plant availability and price uncertainty. We conclude that 
market power is an influential feature of Germany’s electricity markets, and should be addressed by 
more competition-oriented market design. 
 
2 Literature review on market power 
2.1.1 International empirical literature  
Market power normally is defined as the ability to profitably alter prices away from competitive levels 
(Mas-Collel et al. 1995, p. 383). Thus one of the main questions of estimating market power abuse is 
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to determine the “right” approximation of competitive levels. The modeling approach used is generally 
referred to as competitive benchmark. Complex approaches like Cournot or Supply Function 
Equilibria often use it as a starting point or as additional information to classify the model results.1
The chief goal of the benchmarking approach is to estimate a competitive supply function in terms of 
marginal costs. In a fully competitive market no player can influence the clearing price; thus the 
simulated supply function in combination with a given demand level yields the competitive 
benchmark. Arranging the plants according to increasing marginal costs yields the competitive supply 
curve and the difference between simulated and observed market prices allows quantifying the extent 
of market power. Stoft (2002, p. 129) shows that marginal cost pricing suffices to cover the capital 
cost of investment, because price spikes will occur in periods of shortages. An in-depth discussion of 
the issue is provided by Hogan (2007), Crampton and Stoft (2006), and Joskow (2007). At this point, 
we note that the marginal costs should set the competitive prices when the market is characterized by 
overcapacity. 
When monopolistic, oftentimes vertically integrated electricity companies predominated, there was 
neither room nor need for market power analysis. The restructuring of the North American and British 
electricity markets opened the way to rigorous market power analysis. Wolfram (1999) was among the 
first to apply a competitive benchmark analysis to the electricity market of England and Wales. She 
found significant markups during the observed period covering 18 months in 1992, 1993 and 1994, 
although the generators were not taking full advantage of the inelastic demand as oligopoly models 
predict. Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002) and Joskow and Kahn (2002) used the competitive 
benchmark approach to analyze the California market. Both found that in summer 2000, observed 
prices differed from the competitive benchmark price levels which could not be explained by load, 
imports, gas prices or NOx-allowance prices. Mansur (2001) undertook an analysis of the PJM market 
calculating a demand-weighted Lerner index of 0.293, an indicator of significant market power abuse. 
A drawback of competitive benchmark analysis is the necessary simplification when estimating the 
supply curve. Electricity markets are highly complex and access to information is generally sparse; 
therefore, models make assumptions that may influence the outcome. Typically the simulation is static 
neglecting start-up and shut-down costs or minimum load constraints. Missing information about plant 
outages may compound the outcome. Also, the grid is not generally considered a market component. 
Thus, network congestion which can lead to market prices above marginal costs is ignored. Harvey 
and Hogan (2002) undertook a sensitivity test of competitive benchmark analysis by reproducing the 
results and estimating the impact of varying assumptions, and concluded that the differences obtained 
by simulation could result from the real-world constraints that were omitted from the model. 
                                                     
1 For a comprehensive overview about different approaches of measuring and modeling market power see Twomey et al. 
(2004). 
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2.1.2 German empirical literature  
The wholesale electricity market in Germany is dominated by four companies owning about 85% of 
conventional power plant capacity. The German Cartel Office assumes a dominant duopoly consisting 
of E.ON and RWE owning about 60% of generation (Bundeskartellamt, 2006). Given this 
oligopolistic structure, the question arises whether the observed market outcomes represent 
competitive behavior or whether market power is applied. 
Müsgens (2006) first simulated a comprehensive marginal cost model of the German market for the 
period of June 2000 to June 2003. He used a linear optimization model to estimate the competitive 
market prices. Starting in 2000 the observed and modeled market prices coincided until fall 2001, 
followed by a break leading to a divergence between them that lasted until the end of the observation 
period. He assumed that strategic company behavior and learning effects were the main reasons for the 
observed differences. Next, Ellersdorfer (2005) used a two-period Cournot model to study the impact 
of long-term contracts on the oligopolistic model. A competitive benchmark used as well also 
concluded that a significant difference between modeled and observed market prices existed. 
In a more recent study, Schwarz and Lang (2006) analyzed German electricity prices by estimating the 
impact of fundamental price components such as fuel price development and allowance prices. They 
found that from 2000 until 2005, rising fuel prices and in 2005, allowance prices were the major price 
influencers. However, starting in 2003, the impact of market power increased and therefore influenced 
prices. Our paper follows Schwarz and Lang (2006) by extending the analysis to 2006.  
The Sector Inquiry issued by the European Commission (2007) adds a political view to the market 
power debate. Most of its conclusions are applicable to Germany: wholesale markets show a high 
degree of supplier concentration; vertical integration is a dominant factor in many markets; 
international trade is insufficient to provide pressure on domestic producers; there is a high degree of 
intransparency; price formation on electricity markets is complex; and consumers have little 
confidence in the competitiveness of these markets.  
Based on the Sector Inquiry, London Economics (2007) carried out an in-depth analysis using real-
world data and confirmed that the German wholesale electricity market faced mark-ups of up to 50% 
in the past few years. Furthermore an analysis of earned revenues revealed that the two largest German 
companies would have earned 7 bn. € from 2003 till 2005 which is consider sufficient for covering 
investment and start-up costs by London Economics. 
Other studies of Germany’s competitiveness have employed strategic or econometric approaches. 
Zachmann (2006) compared the German and British electricity markets using Markov Switching, 
concluding that the British market had a closer relation to marginal costs . Kemfert and Traber (2007) 
applied a strategic model of the German electricity sector to combine market power and climate policy 
analysis to find that the German wholesale market attained full competition. Hirschhausen and 
Zachmann (2007) tested the impact of emission allowance pricing on electricity wholesale prices in 
Germany. Based on an error correction model and an autoregressive distributed lag model they found 
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that the price for emission allowances is passed through asymmetrically: allowance price increases are 
translated into electricity price increases more rapidly than decreases.  
However, the impact of market power on price formation is not unilaterally accepted. General 
electricity market analyses of Germany with respect to market power are presented by Weber and 
Vogel (2007) and Ockenfels (2007a). These and other authors agree that the lack of full information in 
the empirical model approaches is viewed as a source of unreliability. Due to a steep merit order close 
to peak capacity, the impacts of incorrect availability or price assumptions can produce large, absolute 
errors. In addition the non-linear complexity of electricity markets with many external impact factors 
(wind speed, temperature, and technical restrictions) contribute to the difficulty of designing a fully 
realistic model. Swider et al. (2007) show these issues exemplary for existing model approaches and 
specific time periods. Like Harvey and Hogan (2002) they show that every model has some level of 
uncertainty and thus will produce a range of possible outcomes.  
Melzian and Ehlers (2007) studied the pricing mechanism at the EEX, and concluded that the structure 
of the German market makes EEX prices an improper benchmark. They argue that since price 
formation at the EEX is mainly driven by missing or excess capacity of forward contracts, the price 
cannot be considered as system marginal price. Ehlers and Erdmann (2007) also analyzed the EEX 
pricing formation and concluded that the traded volumes and supply and demand curves do not allow a 
significant price manipulation. We assume that EEX prices act as the benchmark for most bilateral and 
long-term trades in Germany’s electricity market because it is the only transparent price available.  
The problem of fixed cost covering and short-term marginal costs has been addressed by Müller 
(2007) and Ockenfels (2007b). Müller simulated a simplified electricity market with base, mid and 
peak load units to estimate the revenues each plant type earns in a competitive market based on short-
term marginal costs. He concluded that in an optimal market segmentation with respect to installed 
capacity, even base load plants will not cover their fixed costs. Ockenfels (2007b) argues that under 
competitive conditions, market prices above marginal costs are possible and necessary to cover fixed 
costs. Whenever demand exceeds available capacities, the market price is set according to consumers’ 
willingness to pay. Due to the low elasticity in electricity markets this can lead to significant mark-ups 
on marginal costs. We note, however, that this situation did not prevail in 2006 since the German 
electricity market was subject to overcapacities.2 Section 4.3 of our paper discusses fixed cost 
covering in more detail. 
 
3 Model and Data 
This section describes the approach to the competitive benchmark analysis and the data used, the 
objective being to derive estimates for the true marginal costs which are then compared with the prices 
at Germany’s wholesale electricity market EEX. The model simulates a wholesale market in which all 
                                                     
2 In 2006, overall conventional capacity was 103 GW, with a system peak load of 86.2 GW. At this peak, the market had 
surplus capacities of 8.4 GW in addition to 7.9 GW system reserves and an export surplus of 2.1 GW (VDN, 2006). 
 5
demand is cleared via a single market process. However, only about 20% of total consumption is 
traded via the EEX. Since the EEX is the only public source available, we assume the EEX spot 
market acts as benchmark and as a marker price for OTC trading. Demand (load) data is provided by 
UCTE for each hour in 2006. We assume that trading is a competitive activity, so that only generators 
exercise market power.  
3.1 Model formulation 
The model is designed as a cost-minimizing approach with a given hourly demand level d that must be 
satisfied: 
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The model minimizes the total generation costs consisting of the sum of marginal generation costs c 
and the necessary start-up costs (startup). The generation g of each plant p must remain within the 
minimum and maximum capacity constraints in case the plant is operating. The status of a plant is 
determined with the binary condition variable on. The total sum of generation must equal the 
externally defined demand d in any considered hour t. The timeframe for each model run is one 
month. Network constraints are not considered and thus losses are not taken into account. 
Since fossil plants are restricted by thermal conditions, they cannot be turned on/off within seconds. 
According to type of plant, start-up can take a few minutes (small gas turbines) up to several days 
(nuclear). Therefore, it is necessary to decide on the status of a plant before the actual demand 
situation occurs. Following Takriti et al. (1998), we define a minimum online and offline constraint: 
 }{ TLttononon pptptp ,1min,...,1,1 −++=≤− − ττ  online constraint (4) 
 }{ Tlttononon pptptp ,1min,...,1,11 −++=−≤−− ττ  offline constraint (5) 
Since the time interval referred to is one hour, only the offline constraint has been used, assuming that 
each plant can be shut down after one hour of operation. Nuclear plants are assumed to supply base 
load and therefore are must-run plants that cannot be shut down. We assume that gas turbines and 
hydro plants are able to go online within an hour. Therefore, no separate constraints are necessary. 
Coal, steam and CCGT plants are modeled with specific start-up times lp according to Schröter (2004, 
p. 39). Start-up costs are based on DENA (2005, p.280). These costs are added as a cost block startuppt 
in the period of the start-up. As Germany has a large fraction of combined heat and power producing 
plants (CHP) particularly in the industry sector, these plants are treated as must run plants with a 
specific minimum output level. We assume that CHP plants must run at least 50% of their maximum 
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electrical capacity in winter, 30% in spring and fall, and 20% in summer. A detailed hourly heat 
profile is not used. 
The only way to store larger amounts of electricity is by using hydro pumped-storage plants (PSP). In 
our model, PSPs can either demand electricity and fill their storage or use the stored energy and 
generate electricity. If they run in pump mode (PSPup), 75%3 of the consumed energy will be added to 
the storage (PSPstorage) and increase the demand level d of the energy balance. If they run in generation 
mode (PSPdown), the appropriate amount of energy is taken from storage and considered as normal 
generation g in the energy balance:  
  storage equation  (6) 
t1t *75,0 storage
t
down
t
upstorage PSPPSPPSPPSP +−=+
    first capacity constraint  (7) 
max
PSP
t
down
t
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    second capacity constraint (8) 
t
storage
t
down PPSP ≤
The model is implemented in GAMS as a combination of a mixed integer problem for the unit 
commitment and an optimization problem with fixed binary plant condition variables for the actual 
dispatch. 
3.2 Generation capacity and demand level 
The hourly demand level for Germany (UCTE, 2007) ranges between 75 GW at peak and 35 GW at 
off-peak times. The German electricity market is a winter-peaking market with significantly less 
demand in the summer months. Generation capacity is characterized by overcapacity. Total generation 
capacity is about 120 GW including renewable energy sources (VDN, 2005). The basic plant list we 
obtained from VGE (2005, 2006) includes all conventional facilities in Germany with more than 
100 MW generation capacities by plant and fuel types. Available/installed capacity may differ 
according to weather conditions, maintenance, or outages, requiring adjustments to prevent an 
overestimation of available plant capacity and an underestimation of prices in our simulation. To 
account for these effects, seasonal availability factors for each plant type are used according to Hoster 
(1996) with the highest level of availability in winter months. Since our analysis is based on single 
hours, the generalization can lead to divergences in specific cases (e.g., a plant outage of a large coal 
block). We defined a minimum running capacity for each plant according to DENA (2004, p. 280). 
Part of the available capacity may be sold abroad and therefore can not be used to cover the German 
demand. Lack of publicly available information restricts the possibility to deal with this issue directly 
within the plant list. Therefore, we calculated the total trading balance based on actual cross-border 
power flows (ETSOVista, 2007).4 The resulting net flow into or out of Germany is considered in the 
total demand level. Thus when energy is imported, a portion of Germany’s demand is covered by 
foreign plants, reducing the necessary amount of domestic generation and vice versa. However, the 
                                                     
3 Following Müller (2001), modern PSPs have an average efficiency between 70 and 80%. 
4 The values for cross-border flows have been completed using publicly available information from the four TSOs and 
Nordel. 
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modeled prices represent the upper bound in cases of net exports, since plants above market price can 
be used for exports, and a lower bound in cases of net imports since a foreign generator can set the 
market price in Germany. 
Germany has a large amount of renewable energy, in particular wind (19 GW in 2006) and the actual 
demand level to be satisfied by conventional plants varies considerably. Therefore, we reduced 
demand by calculating the hourly wind input for the analyzed days.5 We neglected other renewable 
sources like solar and bio mass due to their relatively small installed capacities.  
3.3 Cost estimates and start-up conditions 
To estimate the marginal cost curve (“merit order”) for electricity generation fuel type and fuel prices 
are needed. The efficiency of each plant is estimated using the age as a proxy: for coal, lignite, oil/gas 
fired steam plants, CCGT plants and gas turbines, the link between the age and the efficiency are taken 
from Schröter (2004). Nuclear plants are assumed to have an average efficiency of 33% (Müller, 
2001) and hydro plants have 100% efficiency.  
Fuel prices for coal, oil and natural gas are based on wholesale price levels of reference, thus we do 
not consider transportation costs or transmission fees.6The price for steam coal is based on prices for 
internationally traded coal at ARA, daily natural gas prices are taken from the Dutch market TTF, and 
oil prices are daily Brent prices. For nuclear plants, fuel costs of 3 €/MWh are assumed leading to 
generation costs of 9 €/MWh.7 As there exists no global market for lignite, extraction costs of 1.76 
€/GJ as shown in the high price scenario in Schneider (1998) are used; this figure over- rather than 
underestimates the real costs. Hydro plants are assumed to have no fuel costs. Hydro plants act as 
price takers like every other plant type. PSPs are modelled as either demand or generators and thus 
have no external marginal costs. The resulting impact on the price level is obtained by optimizing 
pumped storage usage and accounting for the generation costs needed to replenish the storage (see 
Section 3.1). In addition to fuel costs an uplift payment for variable operating expenses is used for 
each plant type (EWI, 2005): coal plants have additional expenses of 2 €/MWh, nuclear 3 €/MWh, 
gas-fired 0.5 €/MWh, and hydro plants 1 €/MWh.  
With the introduction of Europe’s emission allowance trading scheme in 2005 an additional cost 
element has to be considered when estimating electricity prices. Allowance prices can be accounted 
for as opportunity costs of production. Therefore, we calculated plant-specific CO2-emissions based on 
efficiency and plant type following Gampe (2004). The emissions are valued with the allowance price 
taken from EEX (2007b) and added to the fuel and operation costs. 
                                                     
5 The actual energy input depends on wind speeds and is published on an hourly basis by the four German TSOs. 
6 Due to the volatility of wholesale prices particularly for oil and natural gas, generators are expected to sign contracts for 
their fuel supply. The pricing details of these contracts are not publicly available. We assume that wholesale prices are 
sufficient to reflect the average price level. However, this can lead to divergences for specific plants. 
7 Nuclear is not the marginal supplier in the relevant periods, so that the estimate of its marginal costs does not change the 
resulting prices. 
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The marginal generation costs c of a plant in any considered hour t consist of the fuel costs based on 
plant efficiency η and fuel price, operating costs, and opportunity costs for emissions based on plant-
specific CO2 emissions and the allowance price at the EEX:  
 t
pp
t
p
t
p priceCOemissionscostsoperationfuelpricec 2
1 ++= η
 marginal costs of generation (9) 
 
4 Results and sensitivity analysis 
We compare the modeled market prices with observed priced at the EEX for all hours of 2006, 
obtaining markups, withheld capacity and earned revenues for fixed costs coverage. To testify the 
results two sensitivity analyses are carried out. First the uncertainty regarding exact fuel prices is 
considered by increasing gas and oil prices (which mainly influence peak units). Second, plant 
availability is reduced to estimate the impact of uncertainty about technical and external restrictions on 
generation structures.  
4.1 Market power and price mark-ups 
The basic model approach uses twelve runs (one for each month) to simulate the wholesale market in 
2006 and find the competitive market outcomes. The simulated prices and the EEX prices behave 
similarly with a clear segmentation between off- peak and peak prices. However, in off-peak periods, 
EEX prices often drop below marginal generation costs and sometimes even reach zero, whereas the 
model prices reach a level, representing coal and lignite fired base load plants. In general, prices below 
marginal costs are explained by start-up conditions since the temporary shut-down of a base load plant 
can become more expensive than maintaining operations without revenues. Because our model is 
based on perfect knowledge, we note that the price difference may be due to asymmetric information 
(e.g., bidders’ “wrong” expectations about market conditions. Furthermore the model includes 
emission allowance prices as opportunity costs whereas bidders may vary between full, partial and no 
cost past through.  
Model prices in peak price periods were generally below the observed prices at the EEX. Figure 1 
shows the model prices and the observed prices ordered from highest to lowest EEX price. The results 
clearly show that high EEX prices generally do not have an equivalent high competitive price 
counterpart. In the off-peak segment EEX prices and model prices are between 30 and 40 €/MWh. 
However, EEX prices decrease towards zero while modeled prices tend towards a coal plant 
equivalent. In the mid-price segment the EEX prices increase from 40 to about 60 €/MWh while the 
model prices exhibit volatility ranging from 28 to 65 €/MWh with a high number of price 
combinations that diverge strongly from each other. This trend continues for peak price situations 
where EEX prices increase towards their yearly peak of more than 2000 €/MWh while model prices 
remain between 40 and 95 €/MWh.  
However, in peak periods, the competitive prices in the model tended to be lower than EEX prices. 
The average price in 2006 at the EEX is 50.79 €/MWh whereas the model average is about 11% lower 
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with 45.28 €/MWh. For the peak segment (weekdays 8am-8 pm), the difference is more striking with a 
model average price of 52.31 €/MWh (about 30% below the observed average of 74.48 €/MWh). For 
off-peak hours including holidays and weekends, the observed prices are lower with an average of 
38.23 €/MWh compared to 41.54 €/MWh in the model. Focusing only on weekdays, this divergence is 
reduced to 1.4 €/MWh or 3%. Using the underlying demand, the total expenses at the EEX price level 
are 3.6 bn € higher than in the model. 
4.2 Capacity withheld 
To estimate the difference in quantities between the model and the EEX, we calculated the capacity 
withheld for weekday hours 8am- 8pm (off-peak and weekend hours show a high degree of prices 
below marginal generation costs). Furthermore, market power abuse is expected to occur mainly when 
demand is close to the capacity limit. To obtain the withheld capacity all available plant capacities 
with marginal costs below the EEX price but not operating in the corresponding  modeled solution for 
each hour are summed up.   
In 2006, the average amount of capacity withheld during peak hours is about 8 GW, but it varies 
throughout the year. Figure 2 Shows that the average values in the first two months of around 9 GW, 
the gap then narrows significantly from March until June, even reaching an average of -2 GW in April. 
After July, the capacity withheld again increases, with average values between 8.5 and 14 GW. The 
high number of values above 10 GW indicates the existence of strategic company behavior. 
Figure 1: Price Comparison Model and EEX 
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Figure 2: Capacity withheld during workday peak hours (8am–8pm) 
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4.3 Fixed cost coverage 
One further point of interest is how competitive market outcomes translate into revenues for fixed cost 
covering. Pricing is based on short-term marginal costs; therefore, companies are expected to cover 
their investment costs when generators with higher costs set the market price or capacity is lower than 
demand, and both situations can result in price spikes that allow companies to “earn” rents above their 
generation costs. As mentioned, the German market is frequently subject to overcapacities. Thus, the 
price level is expected to give no signal for new investments. The earned revenues do not take into 
account forward trading. Thus, the values represent spot market based results. 
Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. shows the calculated rents generators earned 
according to the model. As noted above, the European-wide emission allowance trading scheme 
includes a grandfathering mechanism that allows the revenues from opportunity pricing of allowances 
to be included in fixed cost covering. Hence, our model must incorporate both revenues for each plant 
type: one that includes allowance prices as marginal generation costs and one that excludes them. We 
use average investment costs as the benchmark. We can calculate an annuity assuming average 
overnight costs per MW, an interest rate of 7%, and 40 years’ duration for base and 25 years for peak 
units.  
Only the values including allowance costs are relevant for estimating market competitiveness. They 
reveal that under modeled competitive conditions, only nuclear plants can cover their fixed costs, 
under EEX price calculations, both nuclear and coal plants can cover their costs, and in both scenarios, 
peak load plants cannot cover their costs. 8 The results indicate that no additional capacities are needed 
in the postulated overcapacity of the German market.9
                                                     
8 The possible rents for peak units may increase since other market segments (e.g., reserve markets) are not considered.  
9 Another issue is the impact of the allowance trading mechanism on investment signals. The political intent is to foster 
investment in emission reduction mechanisms or power plants with low emission values like CCGT. However, the results to 
date point to an absence of investment activity. Due to the base load character of most coal plants and the grandfathering 
mechanism giving the largest bulk of allowances for free, the current market prices set a high incentive to invest in coal 
technology rather than gas-fired units. Based on the values for 2006, the current system fails to fulfill the expected political 
objectives. 
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However, the results do not permit us to conclude empirical which mechanism (competitive system or 
the EEX market) is adequate for fixed costs covering. Due to the long term investment character of 
power plants, importance of forward contracts, fuel price variations, existence of optional markets like 
reserve markets, and the uncertain further development of the emission allowance system in Europe, 
consistent results regarding the issue of capacity financing can only be answered with long term 
analyses.  
Table 1: Annually earned revenues for fixed cost covering per installed MW in 2006 
Competitive Model EEX price based 
Plant Type Including 
allowance costs 
Excluding 
allowance cost 
Including 
allowance costs 
Excluding 
allowance cost 
Annuity of 
Investment 
cost10
Nuclear 
(surplus) 
234 100 € 
(+46 600 €) 
234 100 € 
(+46 600 €) 
271 800 € 
(+84 300 €) 
271 800 € 
(+84 300 €) 187 500 € 
Lignite 
(surplus) 
64 900 € 
(-47 600 €) 
167 100 € 
(+54 600 €) 
114 500 € 
(+2 000 €) 
216 600 € 
(+104 100 €) 112 500 € 
Hard coal 
(surplus) 
60 300 € 
(-29 700 €) 
147 700 € 
(+57 700 €) 
110 200 € 
(+20 200 €) 
197 600 € 
(+107 600 € ) 90 000 € 
Steam 
(surplus) 
600 € 
(-85 200 €) 
2 200 € 
(-83 600 €) 
1 700 € 
(-84 100 €) 
3 300 € 
(-82 500 €) 85 800 € 
CCGT 
(surplus) 
5 000 € 
(42 200 €) 
11 000 € 
(-36 200 €) 
14 400 € 
(-32 800 €) 
20 400 € 
(-26 800 €) 47 200 € 
Gas turbine 
(surplus) 
160 € 
(21 300 €) 
320 € 
(-21 100 €) 
70 € 
(-21 400 €) 
230 € 
(21 200 €) 21 450 € 
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
All model approaches are subject to simplifications, assumptions and mathematical restrictions. 
Further, empirical analyses are affected by missing information and possible data errors. We 
undertook two sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of the obtained results. First, the fuel price 
level is varied by increasing prices for gas and oil by 10%. This should lead to an increase in peak 
prices when CCGT, gas turbines and oil- or gas-fired steam plants set the market price, while off-peak 
prices are unaffected. Second, we varied power plant availability. Due to a lack of hourly availability 
values only seasonal factors are used, which may misinterpret the real availability due to high 
temperatures, low water levels or plant outages.11 The basic availability values from Hoster (1996) are 
altered by reducing the winter availability by 2%, the intermediate values by 3% and summer values 
by 4%. Table 2 shows the available capacities in each season compared to the corresponding values at 
monthly peak load of 2004 (VDN, 2005).  
The impact of the changed fuel prices is only evident during peak load situations when the according 
plant capacities are needed. During these times the price level slightly increases. The average market 
price increases to 46.54 €/MWh (about 8% below EEX prices); average peak prices are 2.5 € above 
the base case and thus still 26% below the observed ones. The impact of reduced plant availability is 
                                                     
10 Nuclear plants are assumed to have overnight cots of 2500 €/kW, lignite 1500 €/kW, coal 1200 €/kW, steam 1000 €/kW, 
CCGT 550 €/kW, and gas turbines 250 €/kW. 
11 Ockenfels (2007a, b) discusses this topic in detail. Other potential model limitations like stochasticity, asymmetric 
information, and opportunity pricing of cross-border transactions and hydro plants are not considered in our sensitivity 
analysis. 
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more distinctive. During off-peak and mid-load periods, the difference is rather small because the 
remaining capacity is still sufficient to keep a moderate price level. During peak situations the prices 
are above the basic model results, particularly in winter and summer months. This effect can be 
explained by the steep slope of the merit order close to maximum capacity in combination with start-
up conditions that lead to prices above marginal costs. On average a market price of 48.74 €/MWh 
(4% below EEX prices) can be observed. Average peak prices increase to 59.55 €/MWh (20% below 
observed prices). In both sensitivities the off-peak prices are little affected. 
However, even the reduced capacity is still sufficient to satisfy demand, thus no capacity rent for peak 
units can be expected.  The average quantity gap in peak hours is reduced to 6.7 GW in the fuel price 
variation scenario and to 5.8 GW in the availability variation scenario. The monthly pattern remains 
similar to the base case with average values above 10 GW in the second half of 2006 for both 
sensitivities. The adjustments do not alter the obtained results of the revenue analysis since the 
revenues of peak and coal units are still below fixed costs. 
Comparing the basic model with the sensitivity analyses and EEX prices shows that the observed price 
duration curve has higher prices in about 4500 h in 2006 (Figure 3). On the other hand, EEX prices are 
lower than the modeled prices in 3000 h.12 All model variations have price spikes of more than 
200 €/MWh (in cases of the availability analysis also 500 €/WMh), which are comparable but 
generally still lower than the maximum prices at the EEX. The mid- to peak-price region (between 50 
and 100 €/MWh) also produces interesting results: a general price divergence of about 10 €/WMh is 
observed for more than 2000 h. This difference is only slightly affected by the changed parameters of 
the sensitivity analyses. Since these differences are observed in price regions that do not indicate 
capacity shortages, the question to raise is weather missing information and model simplification are 
solely responsible for the divergence. 
Table 2: Available capacities 
 Winter Intermediate Summer 
Fossil plants 83 350 MW 77 850 MW 74 170 MWBasic model 
Pump storage 3 900 MW 3 650 MW 4 150 MW
Fossil plants 81 430 MW 74 960 MW 70 320 MWReduced capacity 
Pump storage 3 770 MW 3 460 MW 3 900 MW
Values at peak load  
(VDN, 2005) 
Reliably available 
capacity 
83 130 MW 79 500 MW 74 370 MW
 
                                                     
12 These values correspond to the price duration curves and not to actual model/EEX price combinations. 
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Figure 3: Price duration curves 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the intensity of competition in the German wholesale electricity market in 2006. 
We test the hypothesis of previous literature for 2000 through 2005 that finds significant market power 
abuse. Based on a competitive benchmark model taking into account plant efficiencies, fuel prices, 
emission allowance prices, cross-border flows, start-up conditions, and pumped storage, we estimate 
competitive market outcomes. These are below EEX prices for a large fraction of the observations, 
leading to an average market price in 2006 of 45.28 €/MWh that is 11% below the average price at the 
EEX and about 30% lower during peak times. These differences add to the additional expenses of 
about 3.6 bn € at the 2006 EEX price level compared to the model results. To estimate the resulting 
quantity distortion, we calculate the capacity withheld in peak hours and find that on average about 
8 GW of capacity are not running in the model, although the generators have marginal generation 
costs below EEX prices. These values vary for the different months with average values above 10 GW 
in the second half of 2006.  
We verify the robustness of the results by carrying out two sensitivity analyses: first, fuel prices for 
peak units (oil and gas) are increased by 10%, and second, plant availability is reduced. The latter has 
a significant impact on the obtained results, increasing the average market price to 48.74 €/MWh. 
However, the price duration curve still shows more than 2000 h with prices about 10 €/MWh below 
EEX prices. The models share an inability to reproduce the decrease of the EEX price duration curve 
to zero since the modeled prices are still at marginal generation cost level even in low demand off-
peak hours. The average quantity gap is reduced to 6.7 and 5.8 GW respectively. However, in the 
second half of 2006 these values constantly remain above 10 GW. 
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We also calculate the revenues for generators based on the modeled and observed spot market prices. 
The results show that under competitive conditions, the existing market structure and overcapacity of 
the German market does not lead to full-cost coverage, an expected result. Factoring in emission 
allowance prices as part of the fixed costs covering shifts the results in favor of coal plants, contrary to 
the desired political outcome. 
While we acknowledge the conceptual data limitations of our model, the large number of significant 
price differentials and the corresponding quantity gaps indicate that the market is not yet sufficiently 
competitive to overcome market abuse. 
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